FOCUS

A Mine-free Central America:
How Can We Improve on Success?
Since 1991, the Organization of American States has worked to eliminate the threat
of anti-personnel landmines in the Americas. In 2010, the OAS Mine Action Program
marked a major milestone toward that goal as Nicaragua completed its national demining plan to establish a once war-torn Central America as a mine-safe region. Notwithstanding the success of these efforts, it is important to understand what could
have been done better to achieve mine-clearance goals more efficiently and effectively and how these lessons might be applied to other programs.
by Carl E. Case [ Organization of American States ]

A

fter years of diplomatic, political and
programmatic effort, Central America
is finally considered mine-safe. Bearing in mind the instability and strife that wracked
the region during the 1980s and the extensive
use of landmines by military and insurgent forces, the elimination of the mine threat should be
cause for celebration. However, to paraphrase
Microsoft founder Bill Gates, success can be
a poor teacher because it seduces smart people into thinking that they cannot lose. Setting aside the impulse for self-congratulation,
the mine-action community ought to take a
moment to ref lect on how this achievement
might have been brought about with a more efficient use of the considerable assets required or
on how the final outcome could have been realized sooner. In reviewing the journey by which
the Central American nations arrived at this
milestone with the support of the OAS and the
international donor community, there are some
important lessons other mine-clearance programs can apply to ensure they achieve their
clearance goals in the most effective way.
In the Beginning

Six years before the Ottawa Convention
cemented a commitment to rid the world of
anti-personnel landmines, the OAS had conceived a vision to help the governments of
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Central America emerge from a decade of conflict by clearing landmines from their national territories. In response to a 1991 request
from the newly-installed democratic government in Nicaragua, the OAS called upon the
Inter-American Defense Board, a rarely-used
military adjunct of the OAS, to study the mine
problem in Central America and recommend a
plan of action. Although the IADB’s assessment
focused primarily on Nicaragua, which was the
most severely mine-affected nation in the region, its staff also studied the landmine problem in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras, all of which had seen the use of anti-personnel mines to some extent throughout
the 1980s and had requested similar assistance.
The IADB initially developed assistance
plans for each country, with the exception of
Guatemala, where the government was continuing to battle insurgent groups. Plans were
based on the national military forces’ minecontamination information, which in most
cases was incomplete, if not wholly inaccurate.
Moreover, planning focused primarily on providing initial training and equipment to launch
mine-clearance work without the intention of
sustaining operations for an extended period
of time. Without any significant operational experience in mine-clearance programs,
and with few recent examples of programs in

Officers from the Inter-American Defense Board during a 1991 visit to Nicaragua to
assess the mine problem.
Photo courtesy of William A. McDonough

the world from which to draw important lessons, the IADB lacked
a strong example on which to base
clearance timelines.
By 1997, the OAS effort to support
mine clearance in Central America
had begun to take on a more structured look. The General Assembly,
the main political body of the OAS,
endorsed the work initiated by the
IADB and created a special fund to
accept contributions from donor
countries to support what became
known as the Assistance Program
for Demining in Central America.
The concept of support used in this
program evolved beyond only training and equipping deminers from
national armed forces to providing
teams of international military supervisors. These teams allowed for
quality assurance and certification
of clearance work, while the OAS
established a logistical and administrative structure to support operations in each country, as well as
to continue fundraising efforts. In
June 1997, the OAS General Assem-

bly approved a resolution to “adopt
as goals the global elimination of
anti-personnel landmines and conversion of the Western Hemisphere
into an anti-personnel-land-minefree zone,” aiming to complete mine
clearance in Central America by the
year 2000.1
Defining the Problem

Despite having support from
OAS political bodies and the Central
American governments for an overall clearance goal, the magnitude of
the task in Central America was never clearly established. The specific
sizes and locations of mined areas as
well as the mine densities in each of
the affected countries varied widely.
In Nicaragua, where the armed forces were responsible for planting the
vast majority of mines, reasonably accurate records, including maps, were
available. Although this information
initially yielded a credible basis for
clearance plans, military mine registries ultimately proved to be incomplete, as some installed minefields

had never been recorded or their records had been lost.
In Costa Rica and Honduras,
mines were believed to have been
placed either by Nicaraguan insurgent forces operating from their
territories or by the Nicaraguan
military in areas where borders
were poorly defined or unmarked.
Most of the available information
was based on national military or
security force archives about confrontations between the Nicaraguan government and irregular
forces along its borders. Limited
mine-risk-education campaigns in
Honduran and Costa Rican territories bordering Nicaragua later led
to some reports from local civilians about possible mined areas, but
this source of information was never exploited systematically, nor was
much effort made to undertake extensive survey work in the suspected
hazardous areas.
Defining the extent of contamination in Guatemala proved even
more problematic because few
mines were used during its 35-year
conflict. The primary threat was the
result of unexploded ordnance on
former battlefields about which few,
if any, records existed. Consequently, the approach to the problem in
Guatemala emphasized risk-education campaigns and the focused response of a small clearance team to
reports that campaign promoters
received from people living in the
affected areas.
In this context, planning assumptions were based on what later
proved to be highly inaccurate and
often inflated estimates of the number of mines and areas to be cleared.
Table 1 on the following page shows
national estimates compared to the
number of mines and UXO items
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Country

Initial Mine Estimate

Final Mine/UXO Count

Costa Rica

5,000 – 6,000

446

Guatemala

10,000 – 15,000

518

2

Honduras

15,000 – 20,000

2,405

Nicaragua

115,000 – 120,000

179,6233

Table 1: Perception versus reality: mine estimates for Central America

actually cleared. Where no minefield records existed, estimates were more than 10 times higher than the actual number of mines. Initial Nicaraguan estimates were
lower than the final tally because records on several
known minefields were not taken into account when the
original clearance plan was developed and had to be included in operational plans as the program advanced.
In retrospect, the planning process for mine clearance in Central America was significantly flawed by the
lack of clarity concerning each country’s mine situation. However, planners at the time had few historical
precedents and practically no doctrinal guidelines on
how to develop mine assessments. Prior to the signing

program—as well as other national, international and
nongovernmental organizations—gained more practical experience in mine clearance.
Developing and Implementing Clearance Plans

For the most part, planning decisions prior to 1998
were based more on resource constraints than on specific timelines or clearance projections. Although the OAS
General Assembly had aimed to complete mine clearance in the region by the year 2000, this target was not
based on a rigorous analysis of the situation or available
capacity. By early 1998, Costa Rica had deployed 35 deminers, Honduras deployed 100 deminers and Nicaragua deployed or planned to deploy
400 deminers, but no serious programming had taken place to de2,500
termine how long clearance work
2,098
would actually take.
2,000
When Hurricane Mitch struck
Central America in October 1998,
1,500
the devastation it wrought and the
uncertainty about its effect on mine
contamination forced a more seri1,000
ous review of clearance plans, particularly in Nicaragua. Early in the
500
review process it became clear that
307
281
the goal of a mine-free Central
165
America by 2000 was wholly un0
realistic.
1st Half
2nd Half
Post-Mitch planning, underHonduras
Costa Rica
taken jointly by the Nicaraguan
Army, the OAS program and the
Figure 1: Mines/UXO in Honduras and Costa Rica.
IADB took several previously neFigure courtesy of Carl Case/CISR
glected considerations into acof the Ottawa Convention and the development of in- count. The overall number of mines and mined areas
ternational standards, there was no clear roadmap for was revised as several large mined areas were added
mine-action programs to follow. In subsequent years, to the inventory of demining objectives. Increased inthis issue would come into greater focus as the OAS terest on the part of international donors in helping
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Nicaraguan deminers working in steep terrain in Nueva Segovia department.
Photo courtesy of PADCA

the Central American countries recover from Hurricane Mitch translated into additional funding resources for clearance. A revised National Demining Plan for
Nicaragua took shape, with an expansion in manpower
to approximately 650 deminers supported by both mechanical and canine assets. The restructured plan contemplated the clearance of more than 135,000 mines in
991 mined areas throughout the country with completion projected by the end of 2004.
However, as Nicaraguan deminers began to concentrate efforts in Nueva Segovia and Jalapa departments,
previously unrecorded mined areas were discovered in
what proved to be the most contaminated areas along
the Honduran border. Additional areas were identified primarily through community-liaison and riskeducation campaigns carried out by the OAS or as a
result of Technical Surveys of known minefields that
identified previously unrecorded areas in the same vicinity. As clearance work began in remote zones with

difficult access, the overall number of areas and the estimated number of mines to be cleared grew and the projected completion date for all operations was postponed
from one year to the next. By the time the National Demining Plan was finally completed in April 2010, it encompassed some 1,023 mined areas containing 179,623
mines.
Whereas the dimensions of the problem in Nicaragua were considerably underestimated, the extent of
contamination in Honduras and Costa Rica was greatly overestimated. In both countries, initial clearance
plans were based on the most reliable information available. Figure 1 (see opposite page) illustrates that the first
half of the period from the beginning of clearance operations until their completion resulted in significantly
higher numbers of mines cleared than during the second half of the period. Even as clearance rates per deminer remained stable, the per-mine cost of operations
sharply increased.
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These developments took place
from early 2001 through 2003, a
period when International Mine
Action Standards were in their early stages of development and concepts such as Non-technical Survey
and Land Release were not widely
established. Nonetheless, the same
principles described in the recently published IMAS 08.204 and 08.215
were applied in both Costa Rica and
Honduras to clear numerous suspected hazardous areas and lend a methodology to support these programs
in meeting their clearance goals. By
mid-2002, joint OAS-IADB-Costa
Rican survey work along the Nicaraguan border released the remaining SHAs, enabling Costa Rican
authorities to declare their program
complete in October of that year. In
Honduras, Non-technical Surveys
were complemented by Technical
Survey using mechanical clearance
equipment in an area of Choluteca
department that had been flooded
during Hurricane Mitch. After six
months of Technical Survey and the
discovery of only one nonfunctional, metallic mine at a depth of 1.5
meters (4.9 feet), Honduran authorities concluded that the remaining
risk was tolerable enough to permit them to conclude their clearance effort.
Applying the Lessons Learned

There is no doubt that initial
planning assumptions for clearance programs throughout Central
America were affected by poorly developed mine assessments and estimates. Even in Nicaragua, where
minefield records were more reliable, the original clearance goals
that envisioned completion in 2000
and then 2004 were not realistic. On
the other hand, overestimation of

10

the magnitude of the problem in the
other Central American countries,
and a lack of methodical survey and
assessment, never brought the extent of the problem into focus so that
clearance goals could be defined. In
hindsight, extensive survey work
should have been accomplished at
least as early as 1999 following Hurricane Mitch, but it was not seriously considered until mine-clearance
rates dropped dramatically and the
continuing high cost of demining large areas to find few mines
forced adoption of an improvised
land-release process.
The importance of these lessons
is that they can be used in other programs where the lack of a clear picture on mine contamination can
thwart planning efforts and discourage donor support. The OAS
program, while proud of its role in
supporting the achievement of the
long-standing goal of a mine-safe
Central America, has recognized
the need for defining the extent of
each affected country’s mine problem. The OAS is taking the lessons
learned from its prior experience and
broadly applying them in Colombia,
where reports of mines placed by illegal armed groups are widespread
but offer little focus for clearance
operations. Working with national authorities, the OAS program in
Colombia has made Non-technical
Survey, Land Release, and overall
mine assessment and planning primary points of focus. Based on the
valuable experience gained in Central America, it is feasible to develop
a coherent set of national priorities
and plans that can reduce the time
and the resources needed to address
the problem in Colombia.
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See Endnotes, Page 80
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